Bioteknologia.info

The number of scientific publications on biodiversity issues has grown exponentially since the late 1980s. Biodiversity has become one of the central issues of scientific as well as political concern worldwide, it has been acknowledged as a new type of natural resource [1] and a new target for conservation efforts. [2] Simultaneously the term “biodiversity” has entered the prevalent vocabularies of biosciences and bioethics. The term has also quickly gained popularity outside science and has become a household word widely used by politicians, the media and, at least to some extent, the general public.

Despite of, or maybe because, being such a widely used term, biodiversity still lacks a universally agreed definition. At the most basic level biodiversity is usually defined as richness, variety and variability of life. [3] The disagreements are due to the fact that this conception is very ambiguous and interpretations given to it vary widely in their inclusiveness and concreteness. The least inclusive interpretations restrict the meaning of “biodiversity” only to a number of species currently present in a certain area. On the other hand in its broadest sense “biodiversity” may mean the number and degree of difference of biological elements and processes in all global levels of biological hierarchy. Moreover, the term “biodiversity” is often used in populist and intuitively appealing way to draw people’s attention to environmental crises and potential threats associated with it. In such cases the meaning of the term may differ to some extent from its meaning as a scientific term. [4]

The fact that people representing different scientific disciplines, conservation organizations, administration, media and private landowners use and understand the term “biodiversity” in different ways may be one of the major obstacles for effective communication and cooperation between them. And yet, cooperation of these groups may over the long run be necessary for successful conservation work and management. [5]

In what follows, I will consider whether the meaning of the term ‘biodiversity’ should – for the sake of sound conservation – be restricted to natural diversity alone. In other words, should all artificial biotic elements be excluded from the sphere of biodiversity? The necessary condition for artificiality of an object is that it is created by human beings. Human beings may enhance biotic diversity at any level of biological hierarchy for example by modifying the genome and features of biological organisms (as in organisms created by DNA-technologies) or by causing natural or artificial plants or animals to move into new surroundings (as in introduced species).

2.
In his accomplished and frequently quoted paper Paul Angermeier claims that “artificial diversity should be explicitly excluded from conceptions of biodiversity”. [6] The objective behind this statement is to define “biodiversity” in a way that can provide basis for effective and sound conservation policy. According to Angermeier, the conceptions, which do not exclude artificial biotic elements from the sphere of biodiversity, are consistent with highly questionable “management” strategies. These strategies could involve genetic engineering, species introduction, and environmental modification by which it would be possible to create an artificial biotic word which while lacking natural elements was more biologically variable and diverse than the world evolved through natural evolutionary processes. [7] Angermeier seems to think that a conception of biodiversity should not be accepted if it, together with statements like “more biodiversity is better than less biodiversity”, implies intuitively unreasonable or unconscionable conservation strategies.

Moreover, according to Angermeier the main reason for biodiversity conservation is its instrumental value. The components of biodiversity provide us aesthetic pleasure, scientific inspiration, pharmaceutics, food, materials for clothes and houses, so called free ecosystem services, etc. Some values of biodiversity (for example aesthetic value) seem to depend heavily on the variety of relatively untouched natural surroundings. In contrast some biodiversity values are related to particular biotic elements. For example, particular species may yield valuable pharmaceuticals, and a particular ecosystem may support valuable fisheries. Angermeier claims that in most of these cases “especially valuable elements are natural products of evolutionary processes and therefore components of native [in other words natural] biodiversity”. [8]

In summary, according to Angermeier by restricting the conceptions of biodiversity to natural diversity we form the basis for sound and sane conservation strategies for the following two reasons. (1) Conceptions, which do not exclude artificial diversity from the sphere of biodiversity, are consistent with unacceptable management strategies. (2) Natural biodiversity primarily offers us those valuable services which are the reason for the biodiversity conservation in the first place.

3.
Angermeier’s claim that especially valuable particular biotic elements are not artificial may at first sight seem rather dubious. What about wheat, rice, cattle, pigs and other domestic animals and cultivated plants which are immeasurably valuable to us? Approximately 90% of the world food for people comes from just 15 plant species and 8 animal species [9]. There is no question that these plants and animals have to great extent been modified by humans. And what about the rising concern about the growing genetic uniformity of certain common crop plants? People find many human generated biotic elements very valuable to us and many are actually working to save rare breeds of domestic animals and rare varieties of cultivated plants. [10] Does Angermeier ignore the value of this kind of human generated biotic elements? Or does he fail to consider them as artifacts?

It seems that Angermeier’s value argument might be saved by separating artificial diversity from the human generated one. The term “artificial diversity” is quite commonly held as a synonym for the term “human generated diversity” [11]. Following this tradition every biotic element generated by human beings is an artifact. Cultivated plants, domestic animals as well as human generated landscapes, ecosystems and biotypes are considered as components of artificial biotic diversity. Nevertheless, this view can be questioned. Certain human generated biotic elements, perhaps most clearly the organisms created by DNA-technologies, seem to be artificial in a sense that makes them essentially different from those human generated elements which are produced by traditional breeding techniques.

Two of Angermeier’s statements may be important in the project of separating artificial biotic elements from the human generated ones. First, he “consider[s] artificial diversity to be generated by any addition of biotic elements to wild systems through direct manipulation by humans” [12]. Secondly, he claims that a living being is a component of natural diversity if it is a natural product of evolutionary processes [13].

In a sense traditional breeding methods are based on natural evolutionary processes. Despite human involvement and supervision, the actual process that produces changes in the organisms is exactly the same as the one occurring in wild nature. [14] On the contrary, modern DNA-technologies are based on processes that occur only in laboratories. DNA-technologies usually involve the incorporation of materials from one species to materials taken from another. Since materials originating from species belonging to different kingdoms can be combined, many products of DNA-technologies would be impossible to attain trough natural selection. And in any case, the birth histories of the products of DNA-technologies are impossible in the wild nature [15]. Animals and plants created by DNA-technologies are clearly not products of natural evolutionary processes. Thus, they seem to be artificial in a sense that is quite foreign to biotic elements produced by traditional breeding techniques.

Moreover, plants and animals created by DNA-technologies seem to fulfill Angermeier’s condition for artificiality. They are clearly generated by human beings who directly add foreign biotic elements into them. The important question is whether the more traditional breeding methods involve direct addition of biotic elements too. Domestic animals like cows and dogs, and cultivated plants like roses and tomatoes differ widely from their wild ancestors. It may seem that human beings have very slowly, over the time of numerous generations, added some new features to domestic animals and cultivated plants. On the other hand, it might be claimed that by traditional breeding methods we do not add new biotic elements but only modify the already existing ones. This claim rises a question about relevant differences between adding and modifying in plant and animal breeding. Where should we draw the line between modifying the existing features and adding new biotic elements? I will not further discuss this question here. I just settle on a conclusion that success of Angermeier’s value argument is strongly dependent on the view that artificial biotic elements are separate from the human generated ones.

Nevertheless, even the most sophisticated notions of artificial and human generated biotic diversities do not necessarily save Angermeier’s view. Both the value argument and the argument for exclusion of questionable management strategies need to face following objection.

4.
Robert Lanza, Betsy Dresser and Philip Damiani suggest that many endangered animal species could be saved by a cloning method called nuclear transfer [16]. In nuclear transfer the nucleus of an egg of some common animal like a cow is sucked out and replaced with a whole skin cell from a genetically quite closely related endangered species. The egg is exposed to an electric shock that fuses the skin cell with the egg cytoplasm. By this procedure the egg’s genetic material is changed. The egg begins to divide and it is placed into the uterus of a surrogate mother, which is the same common animal from which the egg was taken from in the first place. In a matter of months the surrogate mother will give birth to a clone of the endangered species. [17]

The method of nuclear transfer is very difficult to carry out in practice. Nevertheless, scientists have already succeeded in it. A domestic cow mother has given a birth to a cloned gaur. [18] Scientists are also attempting to clone the Sumatran tiger and, of course, the giant panda by similar methods. Moreover, there are plans to use these cloning methods to species already extinct but with good supplies of preserved tissue [19].

The recently extinct bucardo, a Spanish mountain goat, is one of the species that scientist are trying to clone. But even if interspecies nuclear transfer succeeds for the bucardo, it will yield only a sorority of clones, because the scientists have tissue from only a female animal. To overcome this problem the scientists are trying make a male by removing one copy of the X chromosome from one of the female bucardo’s cells and replacing it by a Y chromosome from a closely related goat species. They would thereby clearly produce a transgenetic individual.

Individuals produced by nucleus transfer – and most clearly the ones that has gone through the change of X and Y chromosomes – certainly fulfill Angermeier’s conditions for artificiality. Cloned (and transgenetic) individuals are not products of evolutionary processes and their history clearly involves additions of biotic elements (i.e. skin cells or even chromosomes) to biotic systems (i.e. eggs) through direct manipulation by humans. A clone or a transgenetic animal created by the nuclear transfer method actually seems to be one of the most obvious cases of artificial living beings.

5.
Does the possibility to clone animals belonging to endangered species show, that sound conservation methods are not reached by restricting the concept of biodiversity into natural diversity? In other words, does the possibility of cloning offer a counter-example to Angermeier’s arguments for excluding artificial diversity from biodiversity conceptions? Angermeier’s claim that broad biodiversity conceptions – those which do include artificial biotic elements into sphere of biodiversity – are consistent with highly questionable management strategies, remains of course untouched. Nevertheless, the possibility of cloning shows that by limiting the concept (and thus conservation) of biodiversity strictly into natural diversity we may end up loosing biotic elements. But are these biotic elements – i.e. clones of endangered species – valuable to biodiversity conservation? Should the clones be considered as components of biodiversity?

Clones of an endangered species might turn out to be valueless and irrelevant for biodiversity conservation for the following two reasons. First, it might be argued that a clone or a transgenetic animal does not necessarily share its species with its genetic ancestor. Suppose we clone a gaur by nuclear transfer method and possibly also change its sex chromosomes. According to this line of thought the product of this method might not be a gaur at all. The animals created by cloning do resemble gaurs very much. Nevertheless, because of their unusual birth histories, they are not really gaurs. We have by cloning (and gene transfer) produced a totally new animal species. Therefore, cloning can not serve as a method for biodiversity conservation. Moreover, it is questionable whether human produced new artificial animal species – for example the hybrid of goat and sheep – do increase biodiversity [20]. Thus, according to this view, clones of endangered species are not valuable for biodiversity or its conservation.

The view that a clones are not representatives of their ancestor species has serious problems. The animals produced from gaurs by cloning are genetically gaurs. They behave and look like gaurs and they can successfully reproduce fertile offspring with naturally born gaurs. Such being the case, is their uncommon birth history really sufficient to make them non-gaurs? None of the common species concepts – the morphological species concept [21], the biological species concept [22] or evolutionary species concept [23] – seem to imply that a cloned individual is not a representative of its original species.

Second, it might be argued that the clones are irrelevant to biodiversity conservation because they lack some value which belongs to individuals with natural origins. The proponents of this view admit that a cloned gaur is a member of gaur species. Nevertheless the cloned gaur somehow lacks the value that was the reason for the conservation of gaurs in the first place. A cloned gaur is not valuable for biodiversity.

Several philosophers, including Robert Elliot and Eric Katz [24], have argued that the origin of a being may be important for its value. A value of a painting as a piece of art is very much dependent on whether it is an original masterwork or a copy made by a latter ‘artist’. Similarly, a value of a piece of land may depend on its origins. An area, which is created by human beings, lacks some value that a naturally evolved area has [25] Therefore, it seems that a cloned gaur might also be less valuable than the one with natural origins. Nevertheless, this view is not inconsistent with an idea that a cloned or even transgenetic animal can sometimes be valuable object of biodiversity conservation. The view, that a cloned animal lacks some value that the naturally born has, does not imply that the cloned one is totally without value.

The proponent of the view, that cloned and transgenetic animals should always – for the sake of sound and sane conservation strategies – be excluded from the conceptions of biodiversity, must accept the conclusion that cloned animals are totally worthless for biodiversity and its conservation. In other words he has to accept that it is just as good for biodiversity to be without gaurs than to have only cloned ones or the ones originating from the cloned individuals. I find it very hard to accept this. According to Angermeier the main reason for biodiversity conservation is its value to us. The cloned animals probably lack some values that are closely connected to the origins of a being. Nevertheless, the clones seem to share several instrumental values with their wild ancestors. If the wild ancestor turns out to be a valuable source of pharmaceutics, surely a clone would serve these same objectives. Moreover, if the wild ancestor is a valuable keystone species [26] for an ecosystem, surely clones and their offspring could do the same job. By prohibiting the concept of biodiversity to natural diversity we might end up loosing entire species, and moreover, because of the lost of keystone species, even entire ecosystems.

In the case of endangered or extinct animals the alternatives are usually not whether to have the clones or naturally born animals. The alternatives may be whether to have some clones among the individuals of the species or to loose the entire species. Even if a clone may lack some value the naturally evolved animal has, it still is not totally worthless to biodiversity. Analogically, Katz and Elliot do no claim that restored land areas are totally without value or equal to asphalt surfaces. [27]

I conclude that cloned individuals seem to belong to the species from which they originate. Moreover, even if clones might lack some values that are dependent on natural origins, they mostly have the same instrumental values than the naturally born individuals of the same species. Clones are valuable to us and to biodiversity for almost the same reasons as the naturally born individuals. Therefore, the possibility to clone individuals of endangered species shows that by limiting the concept (and thus also the conservation) of biodiversity into natural diversity, we might end up loosing valuable biotic elements. Moreover, the clones of endangered species work as a counterexample to Angermeier’s value argument. Artificial biotic elements can share with natural ones the values which are reason for the biodiversity conservation in the first place.

6.
I admit that Angermeier is right in his claim that those conceptions, which include artificial biotic elements into the sphere of biodiversity, are consistent with highly questionable conservation strategies. Nevertheless, I conclude that the sound and intelligible conservation policies are not reached by excluding artificial biotic diversity from conceptions of biodiversity. Quite the contrary restricted biodiversity conceptions could lead us to ignore some valuable aspects of diversity of life. Human generated biotic elements and even those biotic elements which we tend to consider to be the most artificial ones may sometimes be acceptable and sane objects of biodiversity conservation. [28]

I do not want to claim that naturalness is without value. Indeed, I am inclined to think that natural biotic diversity should be the primary target of conservation efforts. Moreover, I am certainly against replacing the natural biotic elements arbitrarily with the artificial ones. Nevertheless, the valuation of natural objects should be done without devaluing human produced or artificial biotic diversity. It is true that broad biodiversity conceptions are consistent with totally unacceptable biodiversity management strategies, but the more restricted conceptions may be highly problematic too. By restricting the concept of biodiversity merely to natural diversity, we may as well end up into unsound and questionable management decisions, which might mean the lost of some forms of life from species to entire ecosystems. In practice conservation decisions are made in complex situations where numerous values may pull to different directions. There are no easy solutions to conservation questions but that is an essential part of the fascination of biodiversity issues.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Angermeier, P. “Does Biodiversity Include Artificial Diversity”. Conservation Biology 8 (1994), 600-602.

Beattie, M. “An Ecosystem Approach to Fish and Wildlife Conservation”. Ecological Applications 6 (1996), 696-699.

DeLong, D. C. “Defining Biodiversity”. Wildlife Society Bulletin 24 (1996), 738-749.

Elliot, R. ”Faking Nature”. Inquiry 25 (1982), 81-93.

Haila, Y. and Kouki, J. “The Phenomenon of Biodiversity in Conservation Biology”. Annales Zooloci Fennici 31 (1994), 5-18.

Heywood, V. H. and Baste, I. “Introduction”. In Heywood, V. H. and Watson, R. T. (eds.) Global Biodiversity Assessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Jeffries, M. J. Biodiversity and Conservation. London: Routledge, 1997.

Katz, E. ”The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature”. In Katz, E. (eds.) Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997.

Koricheva, J. and Siipi, H. “The Phenomenon of Biodiversity”. Forthcoming in Oksanan, M. and Pietarinen, J. (eds.) Philosophy and Biodiversity. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Lanza, R. P., Dresser, B. L. and Damiani, P. “Cloning Noah’s Ark”. Scientific American, November 2000, 84-89.

Mills, L.S., Soulé, M. E. & Doak, D. F. ”The Keystone-Species Concept in Ecology and Conservation”. BioScience 43 (1993), 219-223.

Peace, D. And Moran, D. The Economic Value of Biodiversity. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1995.

Perlman, D. L. and Adelson, G. Biodiversity: Exploring Values and Priorities in Conservation. Cambridge: Blackwell Science, 1997.

Pimentel, D. et al. “Conserving Biological Diversity in Agricultural / Forestry Systems”. BioScience 42 (1992), 354-362.

Savage, J. M. “Systematics and the Biodiversity Crisis”. BioScience 45 (1995), 673-679.

Spellerberg, I. F. “Themes, Terms and Concepts”. In Spellerberg, I. F. (eds.) Conservation Biology. Singapore: Longman, 1997.

Ulmanen, I., Tenhunen, J. Yläste, J. Valste, J. and Viitanen, P. Biologia Geeni. Porvoo: WSOY, 2000.


* I wish to thank David Kaplan, Juha Räikkä and Markku Oksanen for their helpful discussion and written comments on earlier versions of this article.

[1] Haila, Y. & Kouki, J. ”The Phenomenon of Biodiversity in Conservation Biology”. Annales Zoologi Fennici 31 (1994), 5-18. s. 5.

[2] Spellerberg, I. F. ”Themes, Terms and Concepts”. In Speelerberg, I. F. (eds.) Conservation Biology. Singapore: Longman, 1997. s. 7.

[3] Heywood, V.H. & Baste, I. ”Introduction”. In Haywod, V. H. & Watson, R. T. (eds.) Global Biodiversity Assesment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. s. 9. Peace, D. & Moran, D. The Economic Value of Biodiversity. London: Earthscan Publications, 1995. s. 1. Savage, J. M. ”Systematics and The Biodiversity Crisis”. BioScience 45 (1995), 673-679. s. 673. Jeffries, M. J. Biodiversity and Conservation. London: Routledge, 1997. s. 3. DeLong, D. C. ”Defining Biodiversity”. Wildlife Society Bulletin 24 (1996), 738-749. s. 745.

[4] Koricheva, J. & Siipi, H. ”The Phenomenon of Biodiversity”. Forthcoming in Oksanen, M. & Pietarinen, J. (eds.) Philosophy and Biodiversity. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

[5] Beattie, M. ”An Ecosystem Aproach to Fish and Wildlife Conservation”. Ecological Applications 6 (1996), 696-699.

[6] Angermeier, P. ”Does Biodiversity Include Artificial Diversity?”. Conservation Biology 8 (1994) 600-602. s. 602.

[7] Ibid. s. 601.

[8] Ibid. s. 601.

[9] Pimentel, D. et al. “Conserving Biological Diversity in Agricultural / Forestry Systems”. BioScience 42 (1992), 354-362. s. 354.

[10] Perlman, D.L. & Adelson, G. Biodiversity: Exploring Values and Priorities in Conservation. Cambridge: Blackwell Science, 1997. s. 60.

[11] See for example DeLong 1996, 743; Jeffries 1997, 84; Perlman. & Adelson 1997, 60.

[12] Angermeier 1994, 600.

[13] Ibid. 601.

[14] Ulmanen, I., Tenhunen, J., Yläste, J., Valste, J. & Viitanen, P. Biologia: Geeni. Porvoo: WSOY, 2000. s. 115.

[15] Jeffries 1997, 85; Ulmanen et al. 2000, 115.

[16] Lanza, R.P., Dresser, B.L. & Damiani, P. ”Cloning Noah’s Ark”. Scientific American, Novermber 2000.

[17] Lanza, Dresser and Damiani 2000, 86.

[18] Gaurs are large oxlike animals, which are endangered (Lanza et al. 2000, 85).

[19] Lanza, Dresser and Damiani 2000, 85.

[20] Jeffries 1997, 85-86; Perlman & Adelson 1997, 23-25, 63.

[21] The morphological species concept is based on the idea of separating species from one other by their physical, often outward, visible characters (Jeffries 1997, 79).

[22] According to biological species concept a species consist of populations of interpreeding individuals, able to reproduce succesfully with other populations. In short, if two organisms can produce fertile offspring, they belong to same species. (Jeffries 1997, 79.)

[23] According to evolutionary species concept a species is the smallest population (sexual) or lineage (asexual) diagnostically distinct from other such populations and with discrete linegage. The dignostic characters are often genetic. (Jeffries 1997, 81.)

[24] Elliot, R. ”Faking Nature”. Inquiry 25 (1982), 81-93. Katz, E. ”The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature”. In Katz, E. (eds.) Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997.

[25] Katz 1997, 103-105.

[26] A keystone species is a species whose presence is crucial in maintaining the organization and diversity in their ecological communities. The keystone species are exceptional in their importance. (Mills, L.S., Soulé, M. E. & Doak, D. F. ”The Keystone-Species Concept in Ecology and Conservation”. BioScience 43 (1993), 219-223.)

[27] Katz 1997, 105-106.

[28] My conclusions are dependent on certain suppositions. First, I am considering the ideal cases where cloning can be successfully completed. I other words my considerations are dependent on the idea that cloning (and production of transgenetic animals) can be easily done without causing any serious harm to clones, the cloned ones or any other living beings. In practice, it may well turn out that cloning of endangered species can never be successfully carried out, because of some practical problems like serious health problems of the clones. Secondly, my considerations seem to be dependent on the view that biodiversity is not conserved just for the sake of those values that are connected to natural origins of the living being. In other words my argument could be easily objected by claiming that we want to conserve biodiversity because and only because of its inherent and intrinsic value, which it has in basis of the natural origins of its elements. Nevertheless, Angermeier does not seem to support this view. Thus, he has to either give up his views about reasons for biodiversity conservation or accept that artificial biotic elements may be valuable objects of biodiversity conservation.